There are many similarities between the US, the UK and the Chinese housing markets, including the movements of interest rates and house prices. Some Chinese banks, especially the Bank of China, have been exposed to the US mortgage securitization market. These have triggered a serious concern as to whether the US credit crunch and housing market crisis may be replicated in China. This paper shows that there are some significant differences between China and the West, especially the US and the UK. Compared with the US and other western industrialized economies, the booming house market in China has been supported by fast economic growth, rapid urbanization and high domestic savings. In addition, Chinese banks are less exposed to mortgage defaults than their western counterparts because house buyers are mainly urban and high income residents who are required to have high down payments. These Sino-Western economic and social differences suggest that the US credit crunch and housing market crisis may have some negative impacts on Chinese commercial banks and the overall economy but are unlikely to cause a similar financial and housing crisis in China despite the current struggling Chinese stock markets and a slowdown of house price growth.
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Non-Technical Summary
The US sub-prime mortgage crisis which started from August 2007 has been transformed into a worldwide financial turmoil. Not only were the US banks suffered, nearly all financial institutions around the world were affected because of their investments in the US Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). Between June 2007 and March 2008, more than $430 billion was wiped off the combined market value of the top ten US investment banks, while the losses for the mortgage lenders was about $162 billion (Stamp, 2008) . Both the US Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) acted swiftly and unprecedentedly to rescue the market.
The most dramatic action taken by the US government was the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two of the most powerful mortgage companies in the US, announced by the Bush administration on 8 September 2008. This move is designed to forestall a collapse in house prices that could plunge America into a new Great Depression and trigger chaos on the world's financial markets (The Independence, 8 September 2008) . Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together are responsible for half for the US mortgage market which is worth over $10 trillion. The seizure of these two companies puts a federal guarantee behind a $5 trillion of outstanding mortgage debt.
In contrast to the rather nervous reaction in the US, the UK and other G7 economies have taken a rather cautious approach by keeping the interest rates more or less unchanged in fear of inflation pressure caused by high oil and food prices. China's response has been relatively calm; although Chinese share prices have plummeted by more than 50% in eight months from the end of 2007.
Introduction
The US sub-prime mortgage crisis which started from August 2007 has been transformed into a worldwide financial turmoil. The slump in housing prices increased the default on mortgages, the negative effect further amplified by asset securitization. Not only were the US banks suffered, nearly all financial institutions around the world were affected because of their investments in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). The US Federal Reserves responded swiftly to rescue the market through cutting interest rates and extending financial support to house buyers and mortgage lenders.
In contrast to the rather nervous reaction in the US, the UK and other G7 economies have taken a rather cautious approach by keeping the interest rates more or less unchanged in fear of inflation pressure caused by high oil and food prices. China's response has been relatively calm; although Chinese share prices have plummeted by more than 50% in eight months from the end of 2007. 1 1 China's stock market bubble is not directly caused by the economic slowdown in the world. Rather, it is caused by irrational behavior of speculative investors and lack of experiences of key market players, including policy 1 According to Goldman Sachs, the Bank of China (BOC) was widely exposed to the US sub-prime securities which might generate huge losses . However, BOC's annual reports have showed impressive improvement in its profits. As China's financial sector becomes more integrated into the world economy, there is increasingly interest in understanding the influence of the US housing crisis on the Chinese banks and its wider economy. To what extent is the Chinese banking sector exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage market? Might such an exposure spillover into China's financial sector? With the rapid growth in the market for domestic mortgages, is it possible for China to experience a similar housing mortgage crisis in the future?
This paper aims to answer these questions. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will outline the background of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and its impact on the US and the world economy. Section 3 will focus on China, analyzing its banks' exposure to the US sub-prime securities and discuss how such an exposure may affect its economy. Section 4 will assess the possibility of whether China might experience such a crisis. Sections 5 will draw conclusions and discuss policy implications.
Background of the US Sub-prime Crisis and Its Impact
Sub-prime lending and the housing crisis
MBS represents a debt obligation whose cash flows are backed by the principal and interest payments of a pool of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property.
It originated from the US in the 1970s and was regarded as one of the most important financial innovations in the past three decades. However, such a financial instrument based on risk management can make lenders vulnerable to losses and liquidity stress makers (Yao and Luo, 2008 (Waggoner, 2007) . Till the end of 2006, sub-prime mortgages totaled $665 billion (Figure 2 ), accounting for 23% of the US home loan market (Bernanke, 2008) . Source: Schloemer, et al. (2006) .
3 These three types of loans are quite typical in the US mortgage market. Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) is a mortgage loan which adjusts the interest rate on the note periodically based on a variety of indices, such as 1-year constant-maturity Treasury (CMT) securities and London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). An interest-only ARM is a loan in which for a set term the borrower pays only the interest on the principal balance, leaving the principal balance unchanged. At the end of the term, the borrowers may choose to enter an interest-only mortgage, pay the principal, or convert the loan to a principal and interest payment loan at their own option. The negative amortization loan means that based on some pro-agreed terms, the loan payment for a period can be less than the interest charge over that period and this shorted amount is then added to the total amount owned to the lender. During the previous downturn in the early 1990s, the US average house price fell by 2.8% according to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index (Corkery and Hagerty, 2008 that the house values are significantly less than their outstanding mortgages (negative equity), they may be inclined to default rather than struggle with mortgage payments.
Impact of the credit crunch on the US and world economy
On 9 August 2007, when BNP Paribas froze three of its investment funds, owing to a "complete evaporation of liquidity" in the market, the US sub-prime mortgage crisis broke out (Jones, 2007) . Two credit rating agencies, Moody and Standard & Poor's, downgraded the ratings of 399 and 612 sub-prime related mortgage backed securities (RMBS) respectively soon afterwards (England, 2007) . However, it also accelerated the speed of the US dollar depreciation. Huge amount of foreign investments was withdrawn from the US market, making capital financing more difficult. Meanwhile, these "hot money" imposed greater pressure on the Euro and other currencies, generating turbulences in the worldwide financial markets.
Stock and housing markets around the world plummeted and the threat of the sub-prime crisis nowadays has gone well beyond the borrowers with poor credit to include prime borrowers (Guerrera and Scholtes, 2008; . Both the US Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) acted swiftly and unprecedentedly.
However, it was the ECB which pumped the largest amount of money to rescue the 6 market. Figure billion (Stamp, 2008) . On top of the list was Citigroup, which suffered $40.7 billions losses on their sub-prime related investments; Swiss banking giant UBS and US bank
Merrill Lynch also unveiled huge losses of $38 and $31.7 billion respectively 7 (Murphy and Simonian, 2008) . Goldman Sachs (2008) estimated that total losses could reach $400 billion while the OECD has set the upper limit on the damage of $420 billion. However, if aggregated by other failed mortgage loans, devalued MBS and other bad debts, the International Monetary Fund said the potential losses could as high as $1 trillion (Guha, 2008) .
Apart from the western banks, Goldman Sachs disclosed that one of the biggest Chinese commercial banks, BOC, had also invested heavily into the US sub-prime market and may face substantial losses. As China's financial sector becomes more integrated into the world economy, people are increasingly interested in understanding the influence of the US housing crisis on the Chinese banks and its economy.
To what extent has the Chinese commercial banks been exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage sector? Will the US housing crisis be replicated in China? These are two important questions that need to be addressed so as to get a better understanding of the current Chinese housing and stock markets close to and after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.
US Credit Crunch and Its Impact on the Chinese Economy
Chinese commercial banks exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage
The Capital Weekly (2007) (Table 1) . The disclosure of these losses generated huge turmoil in the Chinese financial market.
BOC clarified immediately that their exposure was not so large as reported. CCB and ICBC confirmed that they only had limited holding of US sub-prime related investments, while the joint-equity banks, CITIC and BCOM, simply denied the possession. CMB announced that all its sub-prime securities had already been settled in August 2006 in a favorable condition.
On 25 March 2008, the BOC released its 2007 annual report. The net profit of the group was up 31% to 56.2 billion RMB, but far inferior to the other commercial banks, such as ICBC, whose net profit rose 65% (Leow, 2008 
US credit crunch and its impact on the China's economy
The US credit crunch directly drags down the Chinese housing market. Figure 5 depicts the movement of the "Chinese Housing Prosperity Index" 7 (CHPI, March 1995=100).
5 CDO is an unregulated type of asset-back security and structured credit product. It is constructed from a portfolio of fixed-income assets which are divided by the ratings firms that assess their value into different trenches. It is an important funding vehicle for fixed-income assets. 6 An Alt-A mortgage is a type of US mortgage which is risker than "prime" but safer than "sub-prime" mortgage. Its interest rate is therefore in between those of prime and sub-prime house loans. 7 CHPI has been designed to capture the overall development environment of the Chinese real-estate industry. It is a composite index calculated based on eight categorical indices, such as real-estate investment, financing, land transfer income, etc. This data is issued monthly by the government using March 199. 5 as the base point. China" showed a similar picture. Figure 6 compares the house price index movements of China, the US and the UK (July 2005=100). After this relatively stable period, a sharp downturn of the market is likely to occur.
The slowdown in the Chinese house market has imposed huge pressure on bank operation and profitability. During the past five years, the proportion of home mortgages to total loans increased from 9.2% to about 15% and became an important revenue generation part of banks operation ( Figure 7) . However, the banks could no longer rely on expanding mortgage lending business to boost profit this year. In the first quarter of 2008, the balance of personal residential mortgages increased by 9.5 billion RMB, or 20% lower than the increase during the same period in 2007. On the other hand, the default rate and prepayment risk increased substantially. For example, the Guangdong branch of the China Merchant Bank (CMB) reported that in the first quarter of 2008, 0.6 billion RMB personal loans 9 were repaid to the bank, of which more than 80% belonged to mortgage prepayment (Shihua Financial Report, 2008) . 8 We tested the correlation coefficient among the UK, the US and China house price indices. The correlation coefficient between UK and China, US and China and UK and US are 0.59, -0.86 and -0.39 respectively, which indicate that house prices of these three nations are correlated. We then run the following regression using house indices of the three countries, China = α + β 1 US+ β 2 UK. We found that both of β 1 and β 2 are highly significant at 1% and R 2 =0.81, which further confirmed that China's house price index is highly influenced by the indices of UK and US. 9 Personal loans includes: personal residential mortgage loans, credit card loans and other loans, in which personal residential mortgage loans account for around 80% of the total personal loans. Moreover, the weakened US dollar and the contraction in US consumer spending hit China's exports hard. Export to the US have slowed significantly since the beginning of 2007, dropping from a 20.4% year-on-year rise in the first quarter to 12.4% in the third quarter (Anderlini, 2007) . As exports accounts for more than a third of China's economic growth and 10% of overall GDP, and the US is the second largest recipient of all Chinese exports, a gloomy US economy might trigger a "turning point" for China's rapid economic growth (Anderlini, 2007 ). China's central banks estimates that if the US's GDP growth declines by 1 percentage point, Chinese exports to the 13 US will drop by 6%, cutting about 2% from the Chinese GDP growth (Anderlini, 2007; Wang and Fan, 2008) . Therefore, it seems that China is unable to completely decouple itself from the rest of the world and keep its double digit GDP growth rate this year. In addition, it has to cope with increased pressure from "idle fund" betting on RMB's appreciation.
Will the US credit crunch and housing market crisis replicate in China?
Threats to the Chinese financial market
Housing boom
House prices in China increased sharply and even doubled during the past two years in some fast developed cities. The Chinese National Development and Reform
Commission showed that the "House Price Index of 70 Large-and Medium-sized Cities in China" rose 7.6% in 2007, 2.6% higher than the previous year. However, the global housing and credit crises have caused the soaring Chinese housing market to cool down as well. The biggest concern of the Chinese government is that the house market downturn following a stock market crash may lead to a potential financial crisis in the country.
As a result, interest rates have been raised seven times from 2.25% in June 2006 to 4.14% by the end of 2007 to cool down the housing market in order to avoid a hard landing as seen in the US. Whether the current policies will work may need more time to prove, but there is a clear sign of a soft landing taking place in many Chinese cities.
Irresponsible lending activities of the banks
If the sub-prime crisis in the US was due to irresponsible lending activities of those banking and non-banking mortgage originators, then Chinese banks must have made the same mistake as their US counterparts. Rising house prices made mortgage lending lucrative and attractive to banks and other financial institutions. On one hand, 15 loans secured on residential property are classified as high quality assets when the house market is booming, normally with a bad debt ratio of less than 1%. On the other hand, the 'Basel AccordⅡ' specified that the risk weight of such assets is only 35%, much lower than some other assets (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006; Li and Lin, 2007) . Therefore, banks have strong incentives to reduce their loan application requirements to attract more and more borrowers. Rapid growth in mortgage and estate development loans heated up the already boiling housing market in China. Although Chinese banks are unable to offer deals to their borrowers with zero down payments like their US counterparts, loose loan granting requirements and numerous faked documents provided by borrowers rendered the banks to unpredictable risks. This problem is particularly serious in China as credit history of a single borrower is hardly available. People can obtain exaggerated payment evidence easily from some private companies which can be ten times higher than the salary they actually earned in order to secure a mortgage (Guo, 2007) . When the market is good, this is not an issue as banks could recover their lending anyway by selling the collateralized estate if the customer defaults. However, in reality, even before the market deteriorates, complicated procedures associated with asset disposal make such Utopian thought easier to say than do. 
Commercial banks in
Interest rate cycle
Interest rate adjustment is widely used as a monetary instrument by most central banks to manage their national economies. Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Chinese housing market to collapse. However, whether the Chinese housing market will crash in the same way as in the US is too early to say as China has a number of social, economic and cultural differences from the US. Hence, what has happened in the US may not be totally replicated in China.
US UK China
Different nature of the Chinese economy and culture
Fast development of China's economy
Different from the US, the prosperity of the Chinese real-estate market is neither simply triggered by low interest rate nor by attractive mortgage products. It has been developed in accordance with the fast expanding Chinese economy. Table 3 compares the GDP growth rates of China, the US, the UK and some other developed countries. trillion, generating a surplus of $262 billion, a rise of 24% and 47% respectively from the previous year . In addition, a large and increasing amount of foreign capital flowed into China during recent years due to an expected appreciation of the RMB. Therefore, it is not surprising that the stock and the housing markets were soaring. Although the "house price index of 70 large-and medium-sized cities in China" increased by 7.6% last year, it was still far below the GDP growth rate and thereby reasonable. As long as such a favorable trading condition remains changed, the turning point of the housing market may not occur.
China's fast growing economy gives more space for income growth. On average, the incomes of China's urban and rural residents increased by 17.2% and 15.4% respectively in 2007. Excluding inflation, the real urban and rural incomes grew by 13% and 9.5%, respectively, which were higher than the growth of house prices. As a result, demand for housing is increasing, leading to a prolonged booming real-estate market.
China's specific social and cultural characteristics
China's huge population, diversified housing requirements, and people's specific savings and consumption habit are distinctly different from the other countries. From the demand side, the US has only one-fourth of China's population, although the territorial areas of the two countries are almost the same. Therefore, there is no doubt that their housing needs are far less than that of China. On the other hand, China's urbanization process has been another factor pushing up house prices. More and more rural people are migrating into cities, but the urban areas that can be used for real estate development are limited (Zhao and Lv, 2007) . As a result, the cost of land has increased exponentially in China over the last 15 years.
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In the US and other western countries, such social transformation process is relatively moderate and bidirectional. Some people rush to urban cities while some others prefer the quiet and peaceful life in the countryside. However, in China, the process of urbanization has been accelerating rapidly in a relatively shorter period of time.
Chinese people's consumption and savings habits are also more conservative than the westerners'. Table 4 shows the house buying intention of different income classes in "China seven biggest cities" in the first quarter of 2008 and compares with three months earlier 10 . (Strauss, 2008) . The house market in China is also different from that in the US where banks lent loans to all kinds of people, especially the low income households. In China, much of the home loans are highly concentrated on the well-off urban middle and high income households. As a result, even if there is a house market meltdown, relatively few Chinese will be unable to afford their mortgages.
Different nature of Chinese commercial banks operation
First of all, Chinese banks require much higher down payments than the US banks. In order to reduce the operational risk to a controllable level, the Chinese Banking Regulation Commission CBRC) requires at least 30% of the total value of the property as deposit, while 100% mortgages were available in the US and the UK. After a series of bank reforms, the problems related to state-owned banks non-performing loans (bad debts) have been solved by and large. The bad debts and sub-prime loans have been small and have decreased over the years. Moreover, as the securitization market in China is in its infancy, the negative effect of sub-prime loan defaults can hardly spread to the whole financial system.
These three points discussed above lead us to believe that the gloomy atmosphere in the US and the rest of the industrialized world may not seriously affect China's economic performance in the near future even though the financial market conditions of these two nations are quite similar recently. The conservative nature of the banks operation and the risk-averse attitude of the Chinese people enable the Chinese commercial banks to survive from the turmoil of the western financial market.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The US sub-prime mortgage crisis violated the stability of the worldwide economy.
By May 2008, the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index had fallen 18.4% from its peak in the second quarter of 2006. Slumping house prices led to more foreclosures as homebuyers had endured difficulty in refinancing their mortgages or selling their houses. Banks tightened lending at a time when home values were sinking and defaults rising, crimping housing demand and causing more price falls and defaults.
The house market crash directly hit the US financial system and its real economy.
Worse still, sub-prime mortgage securitization transmitted the US woes to all the countries involved and soon led to a worldwide financial turmoil.
As China's financial sector becomes more integrated into the world economy, people are interested in finding out the influence of the US housing crisis to the Chinese banks and its wider economy. Banks' annual reports disclosed that their exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage was quite limited. However, as the Chinese and the US 24 housing and financial markets shared some similarities recently, it has been argued that another round of financial turbulence originated from the Chinese house market is coming soon.
Three reasons, aggressive interest rate adjustments, irresponsible lending activities of the banking and non-banking mortgage originators, and asset securitization were regarded as the fuse for the US sub-prime crisis. China possesses two of the above conditions. From 2006, China also began raising interest to control its overheated economy. Increased pressure on borrowers directly triggered the default rate to rise.
On the other hand, although Chinese commercial banks did not provide all kinds of innovative mortgage products to potential buyers during the housing boom, the lack of a credit history system made it difficult for banks to evaluate the credibility of home buyers effectively. Not to mention some of the banks even helped borrowers prepare faked documents to facilitate their applications. As the Chinese economic performance had been impaired by the US credit crunch and its housing market became stagnant, the apparently high quality bank lending could turn bad overnight.
By the time, not only the financial sector, but also the whole society will be under threat.
However, given the specific nature of the Chinese economy and culture, it had also In the first half of 2008, China's GDP continued to grow at a double-digit rate (10.4%), despite a few severe natural disasters that hit many parts of country really hard, including the snow-storms in south China in January and the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008. Therefore, it can be concluded that irrespective of the economic slowdown in the rest of the world, China is still able to propel its own economic growth and trade at a rather ambitious pace. Thanks to limited exposure to US sub-prime mortgage, the performance of most Chinese commercial banks will not be critically impaired. However, several recent developments, such as rising consumer prices, energy shortage, a struggling stock market and a cooler housing market imply that China, especially its commercial banks, cannot be complacent about a potential house market crash and wider financial crisis. To prevent such a crisis, Chinese banks need to strengthen their performance and adhere strictly to the lending criteria set by the People's Bank of China.
First of all, facing stiff competition, Chinese banks need to tighten up the procedures in the mortgage services and cooperate with other institutions to establish a credit history system for home owners and potential buyers. When evaluating a bank's performance, not only the amount of loans generated, but also the quality ---how much of these loans can be recovered needs to be critically assessed. Learning from the US, this kind of assets may turn out to be risky when the market condition changes. When assessing a person's ability to pay mortgage, the banks should always consider this person's income, cash flow and credibility in the first hand rather than simply relying on the current value of the collateralized assets.
In addition, under the pressure of further globalization, Chinese commercial banks 26 should keep learning from western banks on risk management. Although the US housing crisis is extremely serious, banks are able to transfer the risks associated with sub-prime mortgage into the whole financial system via asset securitization. How to use these new financial mechanisms and amplify their positive effects is crucial for the Chinese commercial banks further development.
On the other hand, the US sub-prime crisis provides an excellent opportunity for
Chinese enterprises to refine their investment portfolios and to attract those elites working in the Wall Street coming to China. For example, China Minsheng Bank acquired 9.9% of the San Francisco-based UCB Holdings for more than $200 million and became the first mainland institution to invest in a US bank in October 2007 (Tucker, 2007) . As the value of many western financial institutions was undervalued because of the turbulent financial market, the Chinese government should encourage Chinese companies to acquire major world-renown firms more aggressively.
Finally, in order to avoid any further risks associated with the US securities, Chinese government should adjust the weight of the US investment assets in its whole foreign reserves. Currently, around $130-150 billion Chinese foreign reserves are invested in the US mortgage securities. If the crisis becomes worse, this will directly result in $10-12 billion loss within the next three years (Wang and Fan, 2008) . Additionally, after several interest rate cuts, the yield on US government bonds dropped significantly. Under such circumstances, if the Chinese government could swap part of the US government bonds with some highly undervalued but yet good quality MBS and redeem them back when the crisis is over, higher investment proceeds can be generated. This could also have some positive effects on appeasing the fluctuation of the international financial market.
27
